Released hostages disembark at Rhein-Main Air Base in West Germany, January 1981, ABC News
CONCLUSION:
THE ALGIERS ACCORDS & BEYOND
A compromise between Iran and America ultimately led to the hostages' release but severely strained
the nations’ relationship. The lasting effects of the conflict are still evident today.
the nations’ relationship. The lasting effects of the conflict are still evident today.
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The Algerian government offered to serve as an intermediary for the Iran Hostage Crisis, and the Algiers Accords were signed on January 19, 1981. The document encompassed a broad economic, political, and humanitarian compromise. In exchange for the hostages, the U.S. agreed to unfreeze Iranian assets and not intervene military or politically in Iran’s internal operations.
CBS World News Roundup, January 19, 1981, Gordon Skene Sound Collection
...the United States will restore the financial position of Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 14, 1979....The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran's internal affairs. |
The Algiers Accords printed in the newspaper, January 20, 1981, The New York Times
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Carter’s failure to end the crisis factored into his defeat in the 1980 Presidential Election against
Ronald Reagan whose inauguration on January 20, 1981, was followed by the release of the hostages just five minutes later.
Ronald Reagan whose inauguration on January 20, 1981, was followed by the release of the hostages just five minutes later.
January 21, 1981, The New York Times
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In the hostage crisis President Carter identified himself closely with the fate of the imprisoned Americans, gambling that an intensive campaign of pressure and diplomacy would succeed in setting them free. When that high-risk strategy failed, he accepted the consequences with considerable grace, making no attempt to find a scapegoat or to deny his own responsibility. His approach may be faulted as unduly optimistic about the effectiveness of U.S. pressure on Iran or as insufficiently cautious about his own political fortunes, but it can scarcely be seen as a deliberate exercise in self-promotion. |
The crisis hinted at the rise of modern Islamic terrorism, which would increasingly manifest itself
in events happening directly after the crisis and into the 21st century.
in events happening directly after the crisis and into the 21st century.
Bombings during the Grand Mosque seizure,
Mecca, Saudi Arabia, 1979, Stratfor ...in the aftermath of 9/11 [the hostages said]: 'My God, it began with us. Clip from a personal interview with David Bohrman,
an original producer of Nightline |
...in November 1979 the echoes of the Iranian revolution were felt in Saudi Arabia after Islamists temporarily seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The seizure of the holiest shrine for all Muslims sent shock waves throughout the Muslim world and within the U.S. foreign-policy-making establishment. 
South Tower of the World Trade Center collapsing,
September 11, 2011, Thomas Nilsson The Americans taken prisoner on November 4, 1979, did not know if they would ever come home. Every day they lived with the threat of trial and execution, of becoming victims of Iranian political violence or an American rescue attempt. They lived with the arrogance of Islamist certainty, which prompts otherwise decent men to acts of unflinching cruelty....The men and women held hostage in Iran survived nearly fifteen months of unrelenting fear. They were the first victims of the inaptly named 'war on terror.' |
Khomeini in a way invents modern Islamic fundamentalism, by which I mean, there've been strands of Islamic fundamentalism around for 100 years, but what Khomeini does is he gives it political teeth.
-Fareed Zakaria in The Road to 9/11
The U.S. and Iran broke off formal diplomatic relations, the following decades characterized
by a legacy of continued conflict and compromise only on areas of mutual interest.
by a legacy of continued conflict and compromise only on areas of mutual interest.
Given the intense emotion of U.S.-Iranian relations during the revolution and the hostage crisis, the absence of significant interaction between the two countries was probably the best that could have been expected. For its part, Iran continued to denounce the United States in the most virulent terms on every possible occasion, and there was no evidence of an interest or willingness on the part of either country to restore even rudimentary political ties.
-Gary Sick in All Fall Down
October 23, 1983, Before Its News
The approval of the ayatollah and the prime minister was absolutely necessary to carry out the continuing economic commitment of Iran to Hezbollah, and to execute the October 23 attack [on U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut]. Given their positions of authority, any act of these two officials must be deemed an act of the government of Iran. 
November 17, 1986, Time
In [the American people's] minds were still vivid pictures of Americans being held hostage at the U.S. embassy in Tehran. Khomeini and his people were still the enemy. Americans recalled only too well seeing their country insulted by the Tehran militants burning American flags and hanging dummy figures of President Carter and other U.S. leaders. Could America's own much-loved President Reagan have forgotten so quickly? If not, what possessed him to be making shady deals with the despised Iranian leaders? |
January 26, 1992, The New York Times
America had no natural partners in the Iran-Iraq War, but its interests dictated that the United States allow neither Saddam [Hussein] nor Khomeini to dominate the region and the world’s energy supply. For most of the war, it was Iran that appeared on the verge of victory, so Washington had little choice but to support Iraq. 
December 9, 2013, Time
'We all know the dangers of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon,' wrote Obama, who spent 18 months negotiating the [nuclear deal with Iran] in 2014 and 2015. 'If the constraints on Iran’s nuclear program under the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] are lost, we could be hastening the day when we are faced with the choice between living with that threat, or going to war to prevent it'....Obama emphasized that the deal 'was never intended to solve all of our problems with Iran,' and he warned that undermining it despite no clear evidence of Iranian violations could hasten an arms race or outright regional conflict. |